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In order for us to believe these doctrines, however, it is not sufficient 
(though it is necessary) to refute the charge that they are contradictory. We 
must also have a grasp of the meaning of the formulas we endorse—but 
how is this possible, given that the mysteries exceed the power of human 
reason to comprehend? Leibniz’s answer is that “although one cannot ar-
rive at an adequate comprehension of the mysteries, in order for these to 
be justifiably placed in the cognitive sphere it is sufficient to have a con-
fused knowledge of their meaning. . . . Leibniz readily acknowledges that 
we do not have a clear and distinct knowledge of the concepts of ‘nature,’ 
substance,’ and ‘person’ when they are used with reference to the divine 
sphere. Yet our use of them, even when it is extended to the explanation 
of the mystery of the Trinity, is nevertheless justified precisely because 
knowledge is not limited to what is clear and distinct. However imperfect 
and inadequate the resulting explanations may be, one should not forgo 
them” (xix).
We are all indebted to Professor Antognazza for her lovingly crafted 
monograph. It should prove to be indispensable for students of Leibniz, 
and a valuable resource for all those who consider the doctrines of Trinity 
and Incarnation as well as the relationship between faith and reason.
Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn, by Paul Weithman. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 379pp. $65.00 cloth.
TERENCE CUNEO, University of Vermont
John Rawls is famous for having formulated the most influential account 
of justice in contemporary philosophy and then, shortly thereafter, having 
backed away from it. Why did Rawls change his mind about justice? In 
the Introduction to Political Liberalism (PL), Rawls offers an explanation. 
Rawls writes that we must see the changes he made to the position de-
fended in A Theory of Justice “as arising from trying to resolve a serious 
problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact that the ac-
count of stability in part III of Theory is not consistent with the view as 
a whole. I believe all the differences are consequences of removing that 
inconsistency” (PL, xv–xvi).
According to the dominant reading of Rawls, the “inconsistency” to 
which Rawls refers is this. An overarching aim in Theory is to present an 
account of justice that could form the basis for a stable liberal democracy. 
However, the account he offers—justice as fairness—is broadly Kantian. 
But in a well-ordered liberal democracy, there is reasonable pluralism 
regarding comprehensive perspectives. Because of this pluralism, jus-
tice as fairness is much too controversial to serve as the shared basis of 
the principles of justice in a liberal democracy; it is, after all, the expres-
sion of yet another comprehensive perspective. Rawls’s solution to this 
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“inconsistency” is to re-present justice as fairness as a “political” concep-
tion of justice, one that could be endorsed by an overlapping consensus 
of different, incompatible comprehensive perspectives. In doing so, Rawls 
says that he wishes to do for justice what Kant thought he could do for 
religion, namely, show that we can have reasonable faith in it (PL, 172).
The project of Paul Weithman’s Why Political Liberalism? is to contest 
this reading of Rawls, offering an alternative interpretation according to 
which Rawls is primarily concerned to establish that, in a well-ordered 
society, the principles of justice are congruent with an agent’s good (as in 
Theory) or comprehensive perspective (as in Political Liberalism). Because 
of its narrow focus, Weithman’s book has limited ambitions. It is intended 
to be not a general introduction to Rawls’s thought, but an exploration of 
a single line of argument that Rawls advances. Still, if Weithman is right, 
focusing on why Rawls changed his mind about justice has a significant 
payoff: it takes us straight to the heart of what animates both A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism.
Weithman’s discussion falls into three unequal parts. In the first, 
Weithman articulates what he believes is mistaken about the dominant 
reading of Rawls. The basic problem is twofold. First, it fails to take Rawls 
at his word, since it does not take into account part III of A Theory of Justice, 
which concerns itself with how to achieve stability for the right reasons in 
a well-ordered society. Second, the dominant reading fails to appreciate 
that the “fact of pluralism” is, for Rawls, not simply a sociological datum. 
Rather, it is something to be explained by certain features of liberal de-
mocracy itself.
But what exactly does Rawls have in mind when he speaks of a well-or-
dered society being stable for the right reasons? And how does Rawls think 
it can be achieved? The second and most substantial part of Weithman’s 
book addresses these questions. On Weithman’s reading, stability requires 
avoiding a generalized prisoner’s dilemma in which citizens defect from 
justice as fairness for broadly self-interested reasons. In Theory, achieving 
stability for the right reasons, requires that, in a well-ordered society, each 
agent’s commitment to justice and to his own good be congruent. Rawls, 
according to Weithman, offers an elaborate and ingenious argument for 
congruence between the right and the good. Still, Rawls eventually con-
cluded that his argument failed. The account of stability offered in Theory, 
says Rawls, is “unrealistic” (PL, xviii). The fundamental problem is that 
the institutions of a well-ordered society would be at cross-purposes. On 
the one hand, these institutions would encourage both a sense of and com-
mitment to justice by shaping their character traits. On the other hand, 
these institutions would encourage reasonable pluralism in which differ-
ent agents commit themselves to incompatible comprehensive perspec-
tives. Under conditions of pluralism, however, citizens in a well-ordered 
democracy would be unlikely to converge on how to achieve goods such 
as personal autonomy and unity, the pursuit of which is constitutive of a 
commitment to justice as fairness. For example, traditional theists might 
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hold that the best way to regulate their lives is by committing themselves 
to not justice as fairness but divine commands, where the content of these 
demands deviates from justice as fairness. This, says Weithman, is the “in-
consistency” that caused Rawls to change his mind about justice.
Rawls’s solution to this problem was to revise his understanding of 
what is required for a well-ordered society to be stable for the right rea-
sons. In Political Liberalism, Rawls contends that the sort of congruence 
that is required is not (as Theory supposed) between a person’s good and 
the principles of justice as fairness. Rather, it is between a citizen’s own 
comprehensive perspective and a family of views that approximate justice 
as fairness. Were such a congruence to obtain, then “each person would 
develop and maintain a desire to treat the principles and values of justice 
as fairness as regulative of political life” (281). Achieving congruence of 
this sort via an overlapping consensus, says Rawls, is not unrealistic. We 
could reasonably expect that, in a well-ordered society, each “reasonable” 
citizen would endorse the principles of justice (or something close thereto) 
for reasons intrinsic to her own comprehensive perspective. Interestingly, 
under Weithman’s reading, Rawls insists that citizens be prepared to ap-
peal to public reason when publically debating matters of basic justice and 
constitutional essentials not because appeal to reasons constitutive of one 
or another comprehensive perspective is inherently destabilizing. Rather, 
it is because Rawls thinks that stability requires that citizens be mutually 
assured of each other’s commitment to the principles of justice. And the 
best way to achieve that is for every citizen (under certain conditions) to 
be prepared to appeal to public reason.
In the third and shortest section of his book, Weithman offers a brief 
defense of Rawls’s political turn. In Weithman’s estimation, Rawls made 
exactly the sort of move he should have. Moreover, if Rawls’s political 
turn is feasible in a well-ordered society—and Weithman indicates that he 
believes it is—he will have established what the “dark minds of Western 
thought” such as Augustine, Dostoevsky, and Hobbes thought impos-
sible: that there could be a political arrangement that is both pluralistic 
and stable for the right reasons.
This summary of Weithman’s book fails to do justice to its virtues. Why 
Political Liberalism? offers an extraordinarily close and perceptive read-
ing of Rawls, one strikingly different from those currently on offer. It 
is, for this last reason, likely to be controversial. Some will suspect that 
Weithman’s focus on generalized prisoner dilemmas makes too much of 
a remark or two in Theory. Others will worry that there is more going for 
the dominant reading of Rawls than Weithman claims. It must also be 
said that Weithman’s book is not for the philosophically faint of heart. 
It is a very demanding read. Even those with an appetite for all things 
Rawlsian should prepare themselves for a meticulously presented three 
hundred and seventy page reconstruction of Rawls’s argument for why he 
took his political turn. Having noted both the virtues and the difficulty of 
Weithman’s book, let me close by voicing a reservation about it.
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Rawls’s project, under Weithman’s reading, is to articulate an account 
of liberal democracy that can be stable for the right reasons (342). How-
ever, Rawls does not articulate the conditions under which liberal democ-
racy can be stable for the right reasons in the world as we know it. Rather, 
he articulates the conditions under which liberal democracy can be stable 
for the right reasons under highly idealized conditions. These conditions 
are ones in which agents are members of a well-ordered society. A well-
ordered society is such that it contains no egoists (65), everyone complies 
with the principles of justice (162), everyone wants to participate in forms 
of social life that call forth their own and others’ natural talents (162), 
treachery and betrayal are absent (169), and its members want to coop-
erate with others on terms that are mutually justifiable and affirm only 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines (310). In short, a well-ordered society 
is nothing like the actual world. It is something approximating Utopia.
Suppose, for argument’s sake, that Rawls has succeeded in establish-
ing that, in a well-ordered society, liberal democracy can be stable for the 
right reasons. Why would that matter, given the vast differences between 
actual societies and a well-ordered society? What bearing would Rawls’s 
success have on the project of identifying just arrangements for societ-
ies in the world as we know it? The answer, Weithman suggests, is that 
Rawls will have shown not only “how a just society is possible” (368) but 
also that “political relations need not be ‘governed by power and coercion 
alone,’ nor stabilized in the ways that Augustine, Hobbes, and Dostoevsky 
thought they must be” (365).
I find this answer on Rawls’s behalf puzzling. We want to know whether 
liberal democracy could be stable for the right reasons given the condi-
tions that hold in the actual world—conditions in which egoists abound 
and people do not all embrace “reasonable comprehensive doctrines.” 
Granted, establishing that liberal democracy can be stable for the right 
reasons in idealized conditions might show that we ought not to give up 
on the project of implementing such a political arrangement because its 
implementation is, strictly speaking, impossible. But, as best I can tell, it 
establishes little more than this.
Establishing that such an arrangement can be stable for the right rea-
sons in idealized conditions does not, for example, imply that such an 
arrangement can be stable for the right reasons in the circumstances in 
which we actually find ourselves. And, so, it does not imply that liberal 
democracy is a minimally satisfactory political arrangement in a world 
such as ours, which deserves our trust and allegiance. Nor, for that matter, 
does establishing that such an arrangement can be stable for the right rea-
sons in idealized conditions imply that such an arrangement should func-
tion as a regulatory ideal in our political thinking. Not all ideals, after all, 
are worth pursuing. It might be, for example, that pursuing the Rawlsian 
ideal would make it impossible for us to implement other more feasible 
liberal democratic arrangements that would be sufficiently stable for the 
right reasons. (Rawls, I should note, addresses the charge that his view 
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is utopian in Lecture IV, section 6 of Political Liberalism. But, if I under-
stand him correctly, his concern is different from the one I raise. Rawls is 
worried that even in a partly well-ordered society, we could not achieve 
stability for the right reasons.) If this is right, then Rawls’s project has very 
modest implications, delivering much less than nearly all of us have sup-
posed. It appears to leave the questions that political philosophers care 
about unanswered.1 
1I thank Chris Eberle, Arthur Kuflik, and Nick Wolterstorff for a lively correspondence 
about Rawls’s own views. 
Creation and the Sovereignty of God, by Hugh J. McCann. Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2012. 280pp. $39.95.
PAUL GOULD, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary
Rarely do we find a work in philosophical theology that is novel yet firmly 
entrenched within the theistic tradition. Hugh McCann’s majestic treat-
ment of God’s absolute sovereignty as creator is such a work. God is a 
perfect, simple, timelessly eternal being who, by virtue of his creative ac-
tivity, is solely responsible for the world and its entire history. McCann 
conceives of his project as “a study of God as creator and of problems that 
attend that concept” (1). And problems lurk around every corner, prob-
lems McCann adroitly solves as he defends his favored conception of God.
In chapter 1, McCann presents an inductive version of the cosmologi-
cal argument to show that the existence of the everyday world is best 
explained by the activity of a creator. The most important property the 
creator must have, says McCann, is aseity: “if the creator is to ground 
the existence of contingent beings, he himself must exist of his own na-
ture; there can be no distinction in him between essence and existence” 
(12). But here, McCann moves too fast. All aseity asserts is that there is 
no external explanation for a thing’s existence. It is a further substantial 
metaphysical claim to say that aseity entails that essence and existence 
are indistinguishable. Many will balk at such a claim, for it seems ob-
vious that the two concepts are distinguishable, even for a being that 
exists a se.
If the creative activity of God is alone responsible for the existence of the 
world and its entire history, then God is the ultimate micromanager. No 
detail is too small that it is left to chance or delegated to any subordinate 
agency or intervening mechanism. Questions quickly arise. What space is 
there for the operation of secondary causes? Is God blameworthy for sin 
and suffering? Call the problem raised by these questions (and more like 
them) the Problem of the Divine Micromanager.
